We study the effects of communication in an experimental tournament between teams. When teams, rather than individuals, compete for a prize there is a need for intra-team coordination in order to win the inter-team competition. Introducing communication in such situations may have ambiguous effects on effort choices. Communication within teams may promote higher efforts by mitigating the internal free-rider problem. Communication between competing teams may lead to collusion, thereby reducing efforts. In our experiment we control the channels of communication by letting subjects communicate through an electronic chat. We find, indeed, that communication within teams increases efforts and communication between teams reduces efforts. We use team members' dialogues to explain these effects of communication, and check the robustness of our results.
Introduction
Tournaments between teams are a useful tool to motivate team members to elicit high levels of efforts. Team tournaments can be implemented both within a given company, but also across companies. An example for the within-company case might be a competition of different units within an advertising agency to put forward the best proposal for a large advertising campaign contract, which is then rewarded with a large bonus and additional resources for the members of the successful unit. Likewise, large automobile companies sometimes rely on the competition between several working groups to develop the design of a new car. An example for a team tournament between different companies is a research contest where teams of researchers compete for being the first to innovate or deliver a pre-specified 'product', which is then rewarded by a large prize. There are numerous examples for research tournaments, like the contest to select an engine for the first-ever passenger line between two British cities, which was sponsored by Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 1829 (see Fullerton and McAfee, 1999 , for more details) or the "Golden Carrot Contest" in the early 1990ies when electric utilities offered a 30 million dollar reward for the first company to build a better refrigerator with lower electricity demand and no chlorofluorocarbons (see New York Times, 1992) . Though such research contests have been analyzed from different angles 1 , an important limitation of this specific literature is the assumption that the actors in research contests are modeled as unitary players, as if research teams were individuals. Any kind of internal conflict within teams is ruled out in such a setting. Yet, it seems important and much more realistic to consider the effects arising from the possibility of shirking within teams (as highlighted by Holmstrom, 1982) or the opportunity for collusion between teams. Allowing for communication within and between competing teams may limit the former (shirking), but facilitate the latter (collusion), depending on the precise communication infrastructure available in the tournament.
We are going to present an experimental study where we have carefully controlled and We have chosen an experimental approach for studying the effects of communication in team tournaments because experimental economics allows a systematic and controlled variation of different conditions for communication within and between teams, holding all other conditions constant. In the laboratory, it is easily possible to vary the range of communication that is available for a specific set of actors, while at the same time confronting them with identical tasks. This is much harder, if not impossible, in field studies, which nevertheless provide important and novel insights into the influence of communication on behavior. The paper by Genesove and Mullin (2001) , for instance, is related to our research interests on how communication affects behavior. Genesove and Mullin (2001) have analyzed the written protocols of the Sugar Institute cartel meetings in the U.S. in the interwar-period,
showing how communication among the relevant market suppliers led to collusion by specifying and homogenizing business practices rather than fixing prices. Our context is different from the one by Genesove and Mullin (2001) , though, because they do not consider a tournament design and since they do not address the possible conflicts of interest within single cartel members, but only those between the cartel members. Our team tournament captures both features of intra-and inter-team conflict at the same time and in our experimental design we compare behavior under various communication infrastructures, contrary to Genesove and Mullin's (2001) case study on the specific conditions of the Sugar Institute case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the basic tournament model. The experimental design and the treatments are introduced in section 3. Section 4 derives our hypotheses. Section 5 presents the experimental results, focusing first on effort choices in the tournament and then analyzing the contents of communication and its relation to effort choices. We conclude section 5 by reporting several robustness checks with respect to the parameterization of our model. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and their possible implications.
The model
Our tournament setup is based on Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) . In the following we present already the precise parameters used in the experimental study in order to avoid a repetition of the model in the section on the experimental design.
Consider a group of six workers indexed i = 1, 2, …, 6. The six workers are split into two teams, with workers {1, 2, 3} in team T 1 , and workers {4, 5, 6} in team T 2 . Each worker can independently choose an effort level e i ∈ [0, 100]. Effort costs are 100 / ) ( 
The random variable j ε ∈ [L, H], with L = -40 and H = +40, is uniformly distributed and can be interpreted as a random shock in production or as the degree of (positive or negative) synergy created in the team production process. Team T j 's output is then multiplied by a factor f = 1.5 to generate the team's revenue. 3 This revenue is shared equally among all team members. Competition in the tournament is implemented by allocating a transfer TR = 90 to the team with the higher output, where the transfer has to be paid by the team with the lower output. 4 Benefits and costs from transfers are also shared equally within teams. In total, the expected payoff π of member i in team T j is then given as
The first term on the right-hand side represents member i's share of his team's revenue.
The second term captures member i's costs of providing (individual) effort. The third and fourth term show the expected benefits, respectively costs, from winning or losing the tournament, with P denoting the probability of winning the tournament.
As is shown in full detail in Appendix B, this model of a team tournament has a unique (and symmetric) Nash-equilibrium where all team members choose the following effort 
3. Experimental design
Information conditions
The tournament is repeated for 10 rounds with a partner matching, meaning that the same three subjects stay within a given team and are paired with a competing team of three other fixed members for the whole experiment. Parameters are specified as introduced in the previous section. The number of repetitions was common knowledge (see the experimental instructions in Appendix A). Hence, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the stage game ( 5 . 62
In all treatments subjects face the same parameters and have to enter their decision on their effort level individually and independently on a computer screen. At the end of each round, subjects are informed about (i) the effort level that each member of their own team has chosen, (ii) the random shock of their team, (iii) the output of their team, (iv) the output of the competing team (but not the individual effort or the random shock in the competing team) and (v) whether their team has won the tournament or not. Finally, subjects get to know (vi) their payoff in the respective round. At the end of the experiment, subjects are asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning their behavior in the experiment (see Appendix A for details).
Experimental treatments
The experimental treatments are based on a 2×2 design that is complemented by one treatment with an endogenous choice of the communication channel. The treatments differ with respect to the communication infrastructure within and between teams. It is not possible to restrict one's message to members of the own team only. This treatment combines the options from INTRA and INTER, but leaves subjects with no choice as to which channel to use (contrary to the next treatment).
ENDOGENOUS:
Here subjects can choose themselves whether they want to send a message to the members of their own team only (intra-chat) or to all members of both teams (inter-chat). Subjects can use both types of chats at any time according to their wishes. The endogenous choice of which communication channel to use will provide insights into subjects' preferences and the effects of endogeneity.
In all treatments except NOCOMM subjects could exchange e-mail messages in realtime via a chat program before entering their decision. 6 The time to exchange messages was 8 minutes in the first two rounds and 4 minutes in rounds 3 to 10. When sending messages participants were free to discuss anything except their seat number or anything else that could reveal their identity. Furthermore, making threats or arranging side-payments after the experiment was also forbidden.
Experimental procedure
The experimental sessions were run computerized (using zTree by Fischbacher, 2007 ) in October 2003 , June 2004 and January 2007 at the University of Innsbruck. 408 students participated in the experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments and could only 5 We would like to thank one referee for suggesting this treatment which we had not considered initially. 6 By using e-mail messages as medium for communication it is possible to exclude the influence of physical attributes like attractiveness, resulting sympathies and everything else that might affect behavior in addition to the transfer of linguistic messages (Schweitzer and Solnick, 1999 , for instance, document the existence of a 'beauty-premium' in face-to-face ultimatum bargaining). For some differences between electronic communication (via electronic chat or e-mail) and face-to-face communication see Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) or Kocher and Sutter (2007) . Given that using electronic communication is very widespread in companies and since we were predominantly interested in the consequences of communication and the exchange of messages, we opted for using an electronic chat instead of face-to-face discussion. take part in one session. Sessions lasted about 60 minutes, with subjects earning on average € 13.7.
Hypotheses
Since communication does not change the basic payoff structure of the game (see equation (2)), the Nash equilibrium (with 5 . 62
) might be considered a reasonable benchmark for behavior in all treatments. However, there are good reasons both from economics and psychology why the Nash equilibrium might fail as a good predictor for behavior in the treatments with communication.
Even in cases where communication is 'cheap talk' in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications, economic theory has shown that communication has a large potential to increase the cooperation of interacting players (see, e.g., Rabin, 1994; Farrell, 1995; Farrell and Rabin, 1996; Crawford, 1998) . This is mainly due to messages conveying useful information to other players, e.g. about other players' types, intentions and strategies or about their expectations of other players' strategies. Compared to a nocommunication setting, the possibility to communicate makes cooperation and coordination of players' actions easier to establish and more likely.
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Social psychology has shown that the higher levels of cooperation with communication (than without it) can be explained by two main factors: first, the opportunity to make commitments (even when they are not enforceable) and, second, the possibility to increase the degree of group identity through communication (Brickman, 1987; Orbell et al., 1988; Dawes et al., 1990; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994) . Elster (1986, pp. 112-113) , for instance, has suggested that it is "pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good for oneself. By the very act of engaging in a public debate … one has ruled out the possibility of invoking such reasons. To engage in discussion can in fact be seen as one kind of self-censorship, a pre-commitment to the idea of rational decision." By rational decision, however, Elster (1986) ( )
Maximizing equation (4) 
Given that e i is restricted to the interval [0, 100] in the experiment, the individually optimal effort for the own team as a whole is then given by 100
If a subject i can only communicate with one member k of the competing team, but not with members of his own team (in INTER), maximizing the joint payoff of members i and k requires equation (6) to be maximized:
Note that (6) is not affected by the transfer or the winning probability, since in any state of the world one of both individuals will be part of the winning team while the other one will be part of the losing team. The resulting optimal effort level corresponds to the one that prevails when no tournament is implemented at all.
If communication includes both teams (in INTRA+INTER) then the socially optimal effort choice that maximizes the joint payoffs across both teams follows from equation (8) Table 2 
Results

Behavior in the tournament
Effort levels
Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 about here
In Table 2 we report the results of a linear cross-sectional time-series model with random effects using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). This method allows estimations in the presence of heteroscedasticity across panels. We take the individual effort of a given round as dependent variable, and regress it on the round number, on its square, on dummies for the different treatments, taking INTRA as the benchmark, and on interaction terms of treatment and round.
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Efforts increase at the beginning of the experiment, but exhibit an inverted U-shape across the whole 10 rounds (see the coefficients for "Round" and "Round²"). 
Distribution of efforts
Reaction to winning or losing the tournament
In Table 3 we report the results of a panel probit regression that examines how winning or losing the tournament in round t-1 affects an individual's efforts in round t. Since team members were informed about the other team members' efforts and the competing team's output at the end of each round, they had an opportunity to react to this information in the next round. In order to measure these effects we regressed the binary variable increase ( increasing an individual's effort from round t-1 to round t. Table 3 showed up in a given round and chat, and the value "zero" otherwise. The two independent sets of coding had an average cross-coder correlation of 0.57 for the 11 categories. 12 We then let the two coders discuss all the discrepancies in coding and agree on a single decision for coding. This final coding was used for the analysis to be reported in the following. 11 These protocols add up to about 400 pages of (German) communication. Electronic files of the communication are available upon request. 12 An average cross-coder correlation of around 0.6 (as in our case) is well accepted in social psychology (see, e.g., Orbell et al., 1988) . In economics, the analysis of verbal protocols through coding is very rare. One recent exception is found in Cooper and Kagel (2005) who report an average cross-coder correlation of 0.39.
In about 85% of cases where the topic of coordination (C1) is mentioned, team members actually agree on it. Such agreements are subsequently only broken in about 10% of cases.
Hence, defection from agreements is rare, and most often found in the 10 th round of the experiment, when there is no future interaction. Obviously, before round 10, most team members feel committed to what they agree upon in the chat and because defection can be easily detected. These findings suggest that one of the consequences of communication is to turn the stage game into a (though finitely) repeated game. This makes cooperation more attractive, and we will see below that proposals to cooperate on identical efforts increase the actually chosen efforts.
In about 6% to 11% of observations we find the argument to choose unequal efforts within teams (category C2), for example two members choosing rather high efforts and one member choosing a rather low one. 13 The proposals C1, C2 and C11 are sometimes backed up by arguments concerning fairness and loyalty (see categories C3 and C4 Categories C9, C10 and C11 contain statements that we expect to foster collusion. It is either an appeal to members of both teams not to compete, because that raises effort costs for members of both teams (C9), a proposal to let teams take turns in winning the tournament 13 In order for asymmetric efforts to be 'fair', such proposals are typically associated with the suggestion to use a rotation scheme such that each member chooses a low effort every third round (thereby benefiting from the high efforts of the other two members in a given round).
14 In fact, the inter-chat is only used in 46% of rounds in ENDOGENOUS (and in many of these rounds for non-substantive talk like saying hello), whereas the intra-chat is used in each single round.
(C10), or a proposal to choose identical efforts in order to have the independently drawn random shock determine the winning team (C11).
Table 5 about here
In Table 5 we report a panel regression where we regress the individual effort in a given round on the categories of communication introduced above. In addition to the communication categories we included a variable for the round and its square and the difference between the own team's and the competing team's output in the previous round (in order to control for the outcome of the tournament in the previous round and for dependencies with the behavior of the matched team).
We find in the INTRA-treatment that proposals for identical efforts of all team members (C1) increase members' efforts significantly. Suggestions to coordinate on the same action typically find an agreement.
15 As a consequence, higher commitments lead to higher efforts.
The goal to beat the other team (C6) induces higher efforts, but proposing unequal efforts within a team drives down efforts (C2).
In INTRA+INTER the proposal to choose identical efforts (C1) increases efforts significantly. If teams want to beat the other team (C6) or try to keep their strategy secret (C7), efforts get higher. A significantly negative effect on efforts is found for appeals to fairness (C3), insults against deviating members (C5), an appeal not to compete (C9), and proposals to take turns in winning (C10). The latter category is a sign of collusion, as it is backed up by the argument that taking turns saves on effort costs by avoiding an unproductive race to the top of feasible efforts. 16 The negative influence of insulting defecting members (C5) can be explained by insults either bringing 'effort-busters' (with higher than agreed upon efforts) back in line or by creating a bad atmosphere and leading single members to cheat on the others.
In ENDOGENOUS we find a strongly positive effect of category C1 (proposal to choose identical efforts within teams) and of an attempt to deceive the other team (C8). However, if collusive arguments arise, like e. g. taking turns within (C2) and across teams (C10) or choosing identical efforts across both teams (C11), this leads to significantly lower efforts.
15 It seems interesting to mention that we found in no treatment a significant relation between the magnitude of the proposed identical effort and the relative frequency with which teams agree on an identical effort. This is due to the high frequency (of about 90%) of reaching an agreement once coordination on the same effort is mentioned.
16 Kaplan and Ruffle (2006) show that taking turns is a welcome means of cooperation in two-player games.
In INTER we see that no category has a significant impact on efforts. They are either too infrequent to be relevant or do not have a significant influence.
Result 4:
The most important behavioral effect of communication originates from proposals to choose identical efforts within the own team, thus increasing efforts. Taking turns in winning is a strong collusive argument that drives down efforts.
Post-experimental questionnaire
After the experiment subjects had to answer individually several questions which were ordered in three different sets. Table 6 lists all questions and their mean answers. Please note from Table 6 that not all sets of questions were used in all treatments. In the following discussion we restrict ourselves to the questions we deem most interesting. Concerning Q2 on the attempt to cooperate with the competing team, the relative frequency of subjects answering "Yes" ranges from 36% in ENDOGENOUS to 80% in
INTRA+INTER.
Considering all treatments and correlating the answer to this question with a subject's average effort level, we find a significantly negative relationship (Spearman rank correlation coefficient of -0.15; p < 0.05). Hence, subjects who try to cooperate with the competing team typically choose smaller efforts.
Regarding the questions in set 2, we deem Q7 and Q8 most important. The answers to Q7 can be taken as a (rough) proxy for group identity. Between 73% and 81% of subjects describe the atmosphere within their team as "good" (coding "1"), and there are no significant differences in the rating between treatments (Mann-Whitney U-test is correlated with higher efforts, and making messages public across competing teams reduces the perceived intensity of competition.
Robustness checks
In this section we would like to present two robustness checks concerning (i) the Friedman and Sunder, 1994 , for why the expectation of negative earnings may have undesirable side-effects), we have decided to address both possible concerns in separate robustness checks where the expected payoffs are positive, at least for the hypothesized equilibria. 19 A total of 156 subjects participated in the sessions for the robustness checks, with none of these subjects having participated in any other session reported in this paper. In order to save on subjects and on our research budget (and also to check the robustness of the model for a different team size) we have decided to use teams of two subjects each (instead of setting up teams with three subjects as in the previous sessions).
The sessions were run in January 2007 at the University of Innsbruck, and they took about 60 minutes.
Robustness check r1: 100 * < <
INTRA i i e e
In the upper half of Table 7 we present the parameters and the main results of robustness check r1. In one treatment with these parameters subjects had no opportunity to communicate (NOCOMM-r1, with expected effort Table 8 reports an FGLS-estimation where the treatment dummy "INTRA-r1" and the interaction term "Round × INTRA-r1" show that efforts in INTRA-r1 are significantly higher than in NOCOMM-r1, and the difference is increasing over rounds. The average profits are not statistically different (Mann-Whitney U-test) between both treatments (which is largely due to the concavity of the payoff function and the relatively high standard deviation of efforts in NOCOMM-r1).
19 For reasons of succinctness we dispense with an analysis of communication in the robustness checks and with a presentation of the data from the post-experimental questionnaire. The instructions used in the robustness checks-treatments are identical to those in Appendix B, except that the relevant parameters (see Table 7 ) have been changed. 20 The derivation of predictions in this subsection is analogous to those in Appendix B. Details are available upon request from the authors. 
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In the lower half of Table 7 (Ledyard, 1995; Brosig et al., 2003) . In coordination games, like the battle of the sexes game or market entry games, cheap talk has been shown to increase the frequency of equilibrium play (Cooper et al., 1989 (Cooper et al., , 1992 Farrell, 1987; Park, 2002) . In two-person bargaining games, like the dictator or the ultimatum game, communication makes 'fair' divisions of the pie more frequent and decreases the frequency of inefficient disagreements (Camerer, 2003) . It is noteworthy that these previous studies have implemented ( Yet, these studies have not considered the possibility of internal conflicts within competing firms or bidders, contrary to our framework which has captured both the competition between companies, but also the free-riding incentives within companies.
22 22 In social psychology, there is some evidence on so-called 'team-games' where competition between teams is associated with a free-rider problem within teams. These team-games have the structure of a binary prisoner's dilemma game where the team with more cooperating members wins a prize. Bornstein (1992 Bornstein ( , 2003 has shown Checking the contents of communication we have found that the main reason for increasing cooperation is the commitment that team members make for specific actions. In fact, most subjects feel obliged to align their decisions with their (cheap-talk) verbal commitments and therefore match their words with their deeds in about 90% of cases. 23 In the
INTRA-treatment commitment is typically on identical and very high efforts, whereas in
INTRA+INTER subjects more often commit to intermediate efforts (in order to save jointly on effort costs). The strength of commitment is supported by the opportunity to monitor other team members or the output of the competing team. If commitments or agreements are broken -which can be easily detected (without any costs) -free-riders are frequently exposed to social disapproval by calling them cheaters or free-riders. It is these kinds of (non-monetary) social sanctions which seem to be important to uphold cooperation within and across teams.
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One noteworthy feature of the effects of communication is the fact that it is not the mere possibility to exchange messages between teams that automatically leads to cooperation in the form of collusion. The most convincing evidence for this statement stems from our ENDOGENOUS treatment where subjects can choose themselves whether to use the intrateam chat or the inter-team chat. The latter is used in less than 50% of cases. However, the mere frequency of sending messages (or the number of lines written) in the inter-chat has no significant influence on overall efforts. 25 Rather it is the contents of the inter-chat messages that matters. Only when members of competing teams invoke specific arguments (like taking turns or committing to identical efforts across teams) then one can find a (negative) effect on efforts. For instance, if competing teams use the inter-chat to agree on joint actions, then average efforts are 70.0 and thus close to the collusive outcome, whereas efforts are significantly higher with 84.2 on average in the absence of any agreements.
In sum, our results seem to support the following general policy implication. From the viewpoint of a company that relies on internal team tournaments to induce high efforts of its work teams or departments, it seems a wise policy to provide good communication facilities that communication within teams increases the relative frequency of cooperative choices, but that communication between teams decreases cooperation. These results seem to be compatible with our findings in the more general setting of a tournament with (practically) continuous effort choices. 23 Duffy and Feltovich (2006) have shown in a series of three different two-person games (prisoners' dilemma, stag hunt and chicken game) that messages about one's intended actions have a very high predictive power for actual decisions. Analyzing data from a TV-show that has the structure of a prisoner's dilemma game, Belot et al. (2006) also find that a player's promise to cooperate is a very good predictor for his actual cooperation. 24 In the context of public goods games (without any inter-team competition), Masclet et al. (2003) or Rege and Telle (2004) have found a positive effect of non-monetary (and non-verbal) sanctions on the level of cooperation within groups. 25 The same holds true for the INTER treatment where subjects could only communicate with a member of the competing team, but not with members of their own team. Communication in this treatment does not seem to have any impact on efforts compared to the control condition NOCOMM.
within teams to promote cooperation, but to restrict communication between competing teams to prevent collusion. The Sony Music group provides an example for the latter. Sony Music has several labels under which it sells its music (Columbia Records, Epic Records, Legacy Music, Nonesuch, Sony Classical, …). These labels compete for larger market shares with within-company (as well as outside-company) competitors. The prize for single labels within the Sony Music group is, then, to receive more funds to finance future projects and recordings. The promotion departments of Sony's labels usually have a telephone conference once a week in which the department's 6 to 12 members discuss and agree on particular strategies for promoting the label's products. Interestingly enough, these conferences are typically set by Sony Music headquarters at exactly the same date and time. This might be interpreted as an attempt to limit the degree of communication (and the scope for collusion in marketing activities) between its labels when it comes to making important decisions. To say the least, our experimental results support such a kind of policy. Welcome to the experiment. Please do not speak to other participants until the experiment is completely over. If you face any difficulties, questions, or problems, please raise your hand and an instructor will come to your desk.
Tables
In this experiment, we want to study decision making of subjects. Your decisions as well as the decisions of other participants will remain anonymous. You will be paid at the end of the experiment according to the rules 
groups of 3 subjects each -10 rounds
In this experiment, we will randomly assign you to a group of 3 subjects. In addition, your group will be randomly matched with another group of 3 subjects. The composition of your group and the matched group will remain fixed throughout the whole experiment, which will last for 10 rounds. Hence the decisions of the members of the other group, those of your group members and that of your own affect the result of the game and consequently your payment.
Structure of each round
In each round your task is to choose an integer number from the closed interval [0, 100] .
[Before your decision on the number you have the opportunity to chat electronically with the members of your own group via an anonymous chat forum. You will have 8 minutes to chat with each other in the first two rounds and 4 minutes in the following rounds. You are forbidden to make threats or to reveal your identity, seat number or anything that might uncover your anonymity. [-40, 40 ] is added to the sum of numbers in your group, which yields your group result.
Payment for the group result
The group result is multiplied by 1.5, which generates the group revenue. The group revenue is shared equally among all members of your group. In the previous fictitious example:
each member has to bear his costs:
-costs for member 1: 46²/100 = 21.16 -costs for member 2: 76²/100 = 57.76
-costs for member 3: 10²/100 = 1.
these costs are deducted from each member's share of group revenue:
-payment for the group result for member 1: 64 -21.16 = 42.84
-payment for the group result for member 2: 64 -57.76 = 6.24
-payment for the group result for member 3: 64 -1 = 63.00
Additional payment for the relative group result
At the end of each round your group's result is compared to the result of the matched group. The group with the higher result obtains a bonus of 90 points, whereas the group with the lower result has to suffer a reduction of 90 points. Bonuses as well as reductions are divided equally among the members of a group.
You will always be informed about the result of the matched group and whether your group gets the bonus or the reduction. However, you will not be informed about further details in the matched group (such as numbers chosen by individual members in the matched group or the random number in the matched group).
If in the above fictitious example the matched group had a result of 210, your group with a group result of 128 would have to bear the reduction. That means that each member of your group (including yourself) would lose 30 points.
Summary of total payment
In each round, your payment consists of your share of the revenue of your group minus your individual costs plus or minus the equal share of the bonus or the reduction: ( ) In order to solve this equation one needs to know the first derivation of j P (the winning probability of team j) with respect to i e . In the following, we present, first, a graphical analysis of the winning probability. Second, we will show analytically how to derive the winning probability. To pin down the winning probability one has to, first of all, take into account that the values of the x-axis can only vary in the range of team k's random shock, whereas the realization of y-values depends of team j's random shock and the difference between both teams' efforts ∆, with ∆ = Σe j -
In case of identical team efforts (∆ = 0) -as is assumed in Figure A1 -the possible y-values can only vary in the interval of j's random shock. Hence the set of all points that can be realized in Figure A1 (with ∆ = 0) can be marked as the square with the corners (L, L), (H, L), (H, H) and (L, H), whose area equals (H-L)². This square of possible outcomes in the experiment will be denoted "possible square" in the following.
With the help of the 45° line and the "possible square" set one can define the probability with which a given team is winning. This is due to the uniform distribution of the random shock. For instance, the relation of the area in the "possible square" which is below the 45° line to the total area of the "possible square" defines team k's winning probability. In Figure A1 the respective area in which team k wins is limited by the two dotted lines and the 45° line.
In a more general case like in Figure A2 , in which ∆ > 0, the "possible square" is shifted upwards by the amount of ∆ because the possible range of x-values remains the same. Figure A2 . ∆ > 0
The higher ∆, the smaller the area where the other team k is possibly winning and the higher team j's winning area limited by the bold lines in Figure A2 .
Due to the uniform distribution of the random shocks within the interval [L, H], every point within the "possible square" is equally likely. Hence the probability of winning is determined by the relation of the area of advantageous outcomes (those above the 45° line for team j) to the area of the "possible square", with the latter being defined as )² ( L H − . Then one can arrive at the following winning probabilities for team j (P j ) and team k 
Case 2
The effort of the own team j exceeds the one of the other team k by less than the range of the random shock (see Figure A2 ).
Case 3
The effort of the other team k exceeds the one of the own team j by less than the range of the random shock. From the viewpoint of the own team j one can rewrite the winning probability P j as follows (separating for the moment the four different cases illustrated above): 
The graph of this function looks as follows: 
The first derivations with respect to ∆ are: 
Its first derivation with respect to ∆ is: After differentiating the probability function with respect to ∆, we need to calculate the first partial derivation concerning the player's strategic decision variable i e : Finally one can insert the first partial derivation of the winning probability in the first order condition derived at the beginning of this mathematical proof. Assuming that all 6 players maximize their expected profits in the same manner one can derive 6 first order conditions. Solving them yields equation (3) of section 2.
Similarly, one can derive the solutions for the cases in which single players maximize not their own payoff, but their own team's payoff (see equation (5)) or the total payoff of both teams (see equation (7)). . Obviously, conditions (C2) and (C4) cannot hold at the same time. Therefore, it is necessary to implement the two different restrictions in two separate settings.
